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Abstract
The death of the English National Health Service (NHS) has been pronounced many times over the years, but 
the time and cause of death and the murder weapon remains to be fully established. This article reviews some of 
these claims, and asks for clearer criteria and evidence to be presented. 
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Introduction
Who killed the English National Health Service (NHS)? 
Mixing the film ‘Casablanca’ with the board game ‘Cluedo’, 
let us ‘round up the usual suspects’. Was it Mrs. Thatcher with 
the weapon of competition from ‘Working for Patients’ (1)? 
Colonel Milburn using ‘Foundation Trusts’? Dr. Reid with a 
full healthcare market of the ‘NHS Improvement Plan’ (2)? Or 
Rev Lansley changing the role of the Secretary of State in the 
Health and Social Care Act (HSCA) of 2012? 
The death of the NHS has been pronounced many times over 
the years, but the time and cause of death and the murder 
weapon remains to be fully established. This is because the 
criterion is often implicit, unclear or contestable. Is it linked 
to principles, values, objectives, institutional form, inputs, 
outputs, or outcomes? Is the template of evaluation intrinsic 
or extrinsic criteria, temporal changes, or international 
comparisons? In other words, in a reverse alchemy process, 
what is the anti-philosopher’s stone which changes the gold of 
the NHS into baseless metal.
 
The exaggerated accounts of the death of the National 
Health Service (NHS)
The headlines of some UK newspapers from January 7th 
2015 state that the ‘NHS hits breaking point’ (‘i’), the ‘NHS 
is dying’ (Daily Mirror), is ‘in meltdown’ (Daily Express), and 
is like something from the third world’ (Sun). In more detail, 
according to the ‘Daily Mirror’, our NHS is dying as hospitals 
go into meltdown with the worst waiting times in a decade. 
A beleaguered NHS is on the brink of disaster, is teetering on 
the edge, at a tipping point, and in crisis. 
However, it can almost be said that some commentators have 
claimed that the NHS has been in crisis at some point in 
each of its 67 years of its existence, and – like Mark Twain –
accounts of its death have been exaggerated. Let us start with 
Aneurin Bevan, the Labour Minister of Health who founded 
the NHS. Bevan (3) wrote that new legislation on the NHS 
has been announced, which ‘confirms our worst fears’, and 
if carried through, will ‘mutilate the service in many of its 
most important activities’. A number of commentators have 
argued that the Conservative White Paper ‘Working for 
Patients’ (1) which introduced the ‘internal market’ could 
lead to the end of the NHS. For example, Labour Shadow 
Health Secretary, Robin Cook, argued that the government 
was taking ‘a succession of Granny’s footsteps tiptoeing away 
from a universal, publicly-provided comprehensive health 
service hoping that no one will be sufficiently alarmed by 
the noise to ask the questions of principle raised by each step’ 
(4). Similarly, according to Stephen Lock, the Editor of the 
BMJ, ‘it is not fanciful to talk about the end of the traditional 
health service … its decent principle of uniform access to a high 
standard of medical care’ (4). 
In the run-up to the 1997 General Election, the Labour Party 
claimed variously that there were 7 days or 24 hours to save 
the NHS. As their 1997 Manifesto put it, ‘if the Conservatives 
are elected again there may well not be an NHS in five years’ 
time – neither national nor comprehensive’. 
Pollock (5) pointed to the HSCA 2001, and argued that ‘unless 
the legislation is amended, Bevan’s legacy and the principles 
of universality and comprehensive care upon which the NHS 
was founded will be destroyed, and the Health and Social Care 
Bill will indeed be the last act of the NHS’. Pollock (6) pointed 
to two further possible tipping points. First, she argued that 
if the 1962 Hospital Plan was the high point in the evolution 
of the NHS, the introduction of ‘Foundation Trust’ hospital 
(hybrid public-private-mutual institutions with a significant 
degree of autonomy) marked its virtual demise (p. 130). 
Second, she claimed that in June 2004 the government finally 
confirmed that the NHS as a democratically accountable 
public service was to be replaced by a full healthcare market, 
with New Labour’s death sentence on Attlee’s and Bevan’s 
NHS pronounced by the Health Secretary John Reid, in a 
statement announcing publication of the ‘privatisation plan’, 
the ‘NHS Improvement Plan’ (2) (p. 237-8). 
Contributors to ‘NHS SOS’ (7) suggested yet more death 
sentences. According to John Lister, it could be said that 
the NHS as we know it was abolished in April 2013 (by the 
HSCA) (p. 17). Jacky Davis and David Wrigley claimed that 
the HCSA completed ‘the transformation of the NHS into 
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a fully fledged market’ (p. 119). Oliver Huitson argued that 
the HCSA formally removed the Secretary of State’s ‘duty to 
provide comprehensive healthcare’ – the legal foundation of 
the NHS since 1948- leaving only a duty to ‘promote’ (p. 168). 
Allyson Pollock pinpointed the demise of the NHS: at 2.36 PM 
27 March 2012 the HSCA, repealing the legal foundations of 
the NHS in England, was given royal assent and became law, 
which marked the end of a NHS in England (p. 174-5)
In January 2015, the Labour Party (8) stated that the NHS as 
you know it cannot survive five more years of David Cameron, 
pointing to deteriorating service standards, that are already 
breaching the NHS Constitution guarantees; Tory plans to 
reduce the overall level of spending on public services to levels 
not seen since the 1930s; and ever greater competition and 
privatisation. It concluded that ‘based on the past five years, 
if the Tories are allowed to carry on as they have been, another 
Tory term in power would make the NHS unrecognisable’. 
All this leaves a rather confusing picture. The criteria of the 
end of the NHS appear to include breaching the principles 
of the NHS (e.g. comprehensive, universal, equal, free at the 
point of use) (4,6,7,9), competition and privatisation (6,7,10), 
and changing the duty of the Secretary of State (7). There 
is problem of detecting a clear ‘tipping point’ of a breach 
of principle, partly because of the problem of selecting and 
operationalising the principles of the NHS and partly because 
it can be argued that principles have always been imperfectly 
realised in practice (4,9). For example, Ruane (10) focuses 
on collectivism of funding and the production of healthcare, 
accompanied by planning and based on the devalorization 
of labour, as the central features of the NHS in 1948 rather 
than focusing on principles such as comprehensiveness 
and universality. It can be argued that the ‘free at the point 
of use’ principle is the easiest to understand, and may have 
the greatest resonance with the public. While the NHS has 
seen charges for some services for many years for certain 
groups, these have – so far – not been applied to General 
Practitioner (GP) or hospital visits. Issues such as surplus 
value, valourisation, and de-commodified labour (10) may be 
more difficult to ‘sell’ to the public. Ruane (10) criticises the 
‘top-down policy initiatives approach’ preferring to focus on 
the ‘analysis of the culture of the organization and the actors 
within it’, but such an approach would preclude pointing to 
the HCSA. 
Similarly, the time of its demise remains unclear. It has been 
associated with specific documents such as White Papers 
or Acts of Parliament (6,7). It has also been associated with 
periods. Pollock (6) points out that after 1979 the emerging 
health service – no longer comprehensive, universal or free 
– moved away from being a right, back towards being a 
commodity – as it had been before 1948 (p. 34-5), but also 
that for more than 50 years [i.e. after 1998] the NHS delivered 
high-quality care on the basis of need to most patients 
most of the time (p. 234). Of course, policies interact with 
each other in complex forms of layering (10), but pointing 
to policy evolution masks more precise pivotal mechanisms. 
Moreover, some commentators argue that the template of 
‘Bevan’s NHS’ (comprehensive, universal, free) is difficult to 
sustain given technological push, demographic pull and the 
‘tsunami’ of austerity, but this is dismissed by the ‘sustainability 
deniers’ [see Taylor 2013: Chapter 3 (11)]. 
Moving to a wider comparative perspective, if missed targets 
for A&E waits in England pointed to a NHS on the ‘brink of 
disaster’, teetering on the edge, at a tipping point, and in crisis 
(Daily Mirror), then waits in Wales and Northern Ireland 
that missed their targets by greater margins (77% and 81% 
respectively) (12) must constitute a greater crisis. Moreover, 
the positive evaluation by the Commonwealth Fund (13) 
which placed the UK best of 11 countries on overall rank and 
for 9 of 11 criteria do not suggest a dying NHS. However, the 
data relates to 2011-3, and it is possible that a future ranking 
may show a sharp decline. 
Crying wolf at the cat with nine lives
Minister of Health, Simon Burns (14) claims that every major 
change to the NHS has been caricatured as a relentless march 
towards the end of free healthcare. He points out that Allyson 
Pollock used very similar words for the very different Health 
and Social Care Bills of 1999 and 2012. He claims that such 
accusations have become political grenades carelessly and 
indiscriminately lobbed at anything that looks like change. 
The NHS’s history is peppered by their deployment, and they 
have been so overused over the past few decades, they have 
become rather meaningless. He concludes (optimistically and 
with too much complacency) that after nearly three decades 
of doomsaying, what do we have? An NHS that still provides a 
universal service, free at the point of use, and is as far removed 
from a U.S-style insurance system as any other health service 
on the planet. 
Accounts of the death of the NHS have been exaggerated. The 
NHS appears to be like the proverbial cat with nine lives, or a 
complex TV mystery drama where an assailant stabs a corpse 
killed earlier by a shot to the heart. This is not an argument 
for complacency but simply a request for clarity. Repealing 
the HSCA (8) and to reinstate the duty of the Secretary of 
State (7) would wind the clock back to about 2010, when the 
NHS had already ended by some accounts (6,7). Moreover, it 
is difficult to see how a change in words can end the NHS as, 
according to some of the same commentators, it had already 
been ended while the previous stronger ‘duty’ (to ‘provide’ 
rather than to ‘promote’) was in existence. 
Finally, the ‘weapon’ remains unclear. Is it policy intentions 
(for example in White Papers), which can be modified as 
Parliamentary Acts, or is it the way in which these Acts are 
implemented? What is the balance between ‘structure’ and 
‘agency’ [e.g. the ‘culture of the NHS’; see e.g. Taylor (11)]? 
Just because something can happen does not ensure that it 
does happen. For example, ‘thin end of wedge’ arguments that 
Foundation Trusts can pave the way for privatisation can also 
be applied to GPs (primary care physicians) as independent 
contractors since 1948. So what is needed to revive the 
NHS? Removing Foundation Trusts, or all competition and 
privatisation? More funding? A return to the 1948 model? It is 
unhelpful to ‘cry wolf ’ that every change to the NHS will lead 
to its end. It is possible that the wolf is now at the door of the 
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